இந்தியத் தலையீட்டின் இலக்கு என்ன?

முக்கிய குறிப்பு:

கீழே எமக்குக் கிடைத்துள்ள மூன்று மேலதிக விடயதானங்கள், பிரபாகரனைப் படுகொலை செய்ய இந்தியா சதிவலை! என்ற எமது கட்டுரைக்கு மேலும் வலுச்சேர்க்கின்றன.

1) ஹரிகரனின் மதிப்பீடுகள் அ) இந்தியா நேரடித்தலையீட்டிற்கு தயாராகிவிட்டது ஆ) கருணாநிதி இந்திய விஸ்தரிப்புவாதத்துடன் தொப்புள் கொடி உறவு கொண்டவர் இ)பிரபாகரனைத் தனிமைப்படுத்தி சமாதானத்தின் விரோதி என்கிறார் என்ற மதிப்பீடுகளை ஆதரித்து நிற்கின்றன-அவருடைய பாசையில்!.

2) Neville Ladduwahetty இன் 13வது திருத்தச்சட்டம் அ) ஒற்றைத்துருவ அமெரிக்க ஏகாதிபத்தியத்தின் சேவகனாக இந்தியா மாறிவிட்டதை மறைத்துக் கொண்டாலும் சீனாவுக்கு எதிராக இந்து சமுத்திரப் பிராந்தியத்தில் இந்தியா ஆயுதப் போட்டியில் இறங்கியுள்ளதை ஒத்துக்கொள்கிறார். ஆ) மேலும் அவர் குறிப்பிடத்தக்க வகையில் தற்போதைய சூழ்நிலையில், 1987 இல் மாகாணத்தை அடிப்படை அலகாகக் கொண்ட அரசியல் தீர்வு இன்றைய சூழ்நிலையில் இந்தியாவின் இறையாண்மைக்கும், பாதுகாப்புக்கும் அச்சுறுத்தலாகும் என்கிறார். இதை நாம் அரசியல் தீர்வுக்கான வாய்ப்புக்கள் இல்லை அதனால் இந்தியத் தலையீடு மற்றொரு யுத்தத்திற்கே இட்டுச்செல்லும் என்று கூறினோம்.

3) முகமாலையில் இலங்கை இராணுவம் வாங்கிய அடி Island பத்திரிகையையே தவிர்க்க இயலாமல் உண்மைபேச வைத்திருக்கிறது.. இதன் மூலம் இந்தியாவின் உதவி கோர முயல்கிறது. ஹரிகரன் சொல்வது போல் முகமாலைச் சமரும், சட்டசபைத் தீர்மானமும் தற்செயலாக ஒன்றிணைந்தவையல்ல. அவை திட்டமிட்டு முன்கூட்டியே தீர்மானிக்கப்பட்டவை.எனவே இவற்றை ஆழ்ந்து அணுகி நுணுகி ஆராய்ந்து படிக்குமாறு நமது வாசகர்களை வேண்டிக்கொள்கின்றோம். ENB

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Time has come for fresh Indian initiative in Sri Lanka

By Col R Hariharan (retd.)

The Tamil Nadu state assembly resolution calling upon the Centre to take steps to bring peace in Sri Lanka last Wednesday, April 24, merits follow up action by all those who aspire for resolving the Sri Lanka Tamil issue peacefully.The resolution perhaps for the first time reflects the desire of Tamils everywhere for India to take a more proactive role in Sri Lanka in the interest of all stakeholders – people of India and Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka Tamil Diaspora and the international community. Its constructive tone for finding a peaceful resolution of the problem, rather than the polemical Tamil political rhetoric adopted in the past, is too good to be trivialised.Coincidentally, the resolution was passed when the Eelam War-4 hit the hottest point of combat at Muhamalai causing heavy casualties on both sides. With over 7000 lives already lost since December 2005 in the endless conflict, civil society in India and Sri Lanka jaded by failure to be effective in the past should now renew their efforts to use the small opening provided by the TN assembly resolution to turn it into a productive opportunity.The resolution, briefly worded perhaps for political reasons, by itself does not indicate possible outcome. However, Chief Minister Karunanidhi's eloquent speech onthe occasion gives sufficient indications for all stakeholders on the subtle changes taking place in Tamil Nadu political perceptions on the subject.It is significant that in his speech Karunanidhi had defended India's (Centre's) policy on Sri Lanka. This sends a message to the Tamil protagonists of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) who had been counting on his support to the LTTE war. His pointed reference to the lack of unity among Tamils and criticism of thekilling of Tamil leaders like A Amirthalingam without naming the LTTE makes it clear that he does not equate the LTTE war with the struggle of Tamils for autonomy.And as a corollary it raises a big question mark on the LTTE claims as the sole representative of Tamils.At the same time his lament for the failure of Tamils to unite and achieve success as the Maoists in Nepal have done indicates that his heart supports the Tamil Eelam.But his head seems to have dictated that it was not pragmatic. His pragmatism in approach is relevant because he is perhaps one Tamil leader who is widelyrespected by Tamils (including politicians and Tamil Diaspora) everywhere and he has the potential to evolve a Tamil consensus on the subject. His speech has givenadequate indications for them to take positive follow up action in three directions –persuade India for active involvement, persuade Sri Lanka and the LTTE to ceasetheir quest for a military solution, and take measures for initiating a holistic and structured approach to find a peaceful resolution of the Tamil quest for autonomywithout threatening Sri Lanka's sovereignty.Stakeholders' responseSpeculating on the stakeholders' response to the resolution is risky. Many observers of the scene would be tempted to dismiss it as a political ploy of the ChiefMinister to prevent the Patali Makka Katchi (PMK) leader Dr Ramadoss and Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (MDMK) leader Vaiko from cashing inon the Sri Lanka Tamil issue in the local political scene. However, this issue has ceased to be a hot 'vote catcher' issue in Tamil Nadu for sometime now. Moreover,the war in Sri Lanka is going on too long to be ignored and any opportunity to resolve it should not be dismissed on cynical considerations. And the resolution offersone such opportunity.Perhaps, Delhi has got its own internal dissonance on Sri Lanka within the government and the ruling coalition. At present, Tamil Nadu has a disproportionately largeclout at the Centre and within the ruling and opposition coalitions. It is time for Tamil lawmakers in Delhi to close their ranks on this issue and demand a fresh Indianinitiative in Sri Lanka.As far as Sri Lanka is considered, its adroit President Rajapaksa by now must have understood that the end of the tunnel was still not visible despite the huge cost oflives resources paid in the war so far. It should be equally clear that a fresh political initiative with India at the helm could possibly be a better way of resolving theissue. If nothing else, it would save a few billion dollars down the drain and a few thousand lives, while presenting a possibility of success, than pursuing a purely military option.The international community (a.k.a. four co-chairs in Sri Lanka context) is perhaps wiser now of the limitations of Norwegian mediation and their own actions, longon rhetoric and short on results. Perhaps they should consider asking India to don the mantle for a change to give a lease of life to their well meaning efforts in Sri Lanka.It is too tempting to dismiss the LTTE as irrelevant in any peace process. However, it will continue to be an important denominator in the issue. At the risk of beingbranded as the LTTE's 'military guru' as some wise Sri Lanka columnist had done, I can say the LTTE has enough brains to know that the current war is reaching apoint of no return. Inflicting more body counts or carrying out more suicide bombings – as the Tanil Nadu resolution was greeted – is not going to resolve the miseryof millions of Tamils. It is time for the LTTE to show "Vivekam" (wisdom with discretion) in addition to its much touted "Veeram" (valour) because the war is goingbeyond the military domain.The LTTE is not known to listen to external advice. I can only hope that it reads this and makes a pragmatic reassessment of the situation as the Kalaignar(Karunanidhi) has done. And that has only added to his stature. Will the LTTE do it? That is an answer its supporters and admirers should demand. There is no timeto be lost anymore.

(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90.He is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies. )

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Thirteenth Amendment and developments in Indian Ocean

by Neville Ladduwahetty

The former Indian Minister for External Affairs, Yashwant Singha, has welcomedthe Sri Lankan Government’s decision to set up Provincial Councils in the Northern and Eastern Provinces as required by the 13th Amendment to the Constitution.This Constitutional provision was the outcome of the Indo-Lanka Accord following India’s intervention in Sri Lanka in 1987 to resolve Sri Lanka’s national question.At the heart of the 13th Amendment is the recognition of the province as the peripheral unit. It was with the province as unit that the Tamil community planned tocreate a single political unit by merging the Northern and Eastern Provinces within which they would be the majority.

The Indian Government acquiesced to thedemand of the Tamil community to recognise the province as the unit, since India was confident that political arrangements in Sri Lanka would not in any way affect itsown stability or territorial integrity. However, with the unexpected developments in Sri Lanka and the very significant developments in and around the Indiansubcontinent and in the Indian Ocean over the last two decades, these political arrangements in Sri Lanka have the potential to inexorably threaten India’s nationalinterests and its security.The retention of the Northern and Eastern Provinces as two separate political units is a development not envisaged when India imposed the province as the politicalunit under the 13th Amendment.

The liberation of the Eastern Province from the LTTE and the consequent isolation of the Jaffna Tamil influence from the politics ofthe Eastern Province have endorsed this separation for the first time. The outcome of the forthcoming Provincial Council election may consolidate this separation evenfurther.The Indo-Lanka Accord was crafted to prevent developments of the sort that have occurred recently from taking place. Perhaps the perspective two decades agowas that a single political unit comprising the Northern and Eastern Provinces would meet the aspirations of the Sri Lankan Tamils; a condition that would stabilise theSouth flank of India. The political separation of the Eastern Province limits the LTTE and the Jaffna Tamil community to the Northern Province; a condition that hasthe potential to become a source of discontent with consequences on India’s South flank.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT

Since independence, India’s Western flank has been unstable because of its relations with Pakistan over the future of Kashmir. There are ongoing claims and counterclaims over Northern border issues with China. China wants to keep Ahsai Chin, an area about 35,000 square miles in Ladakh, Kashmir, which it seized from Indiain 1962 since it forms a strategic inroad to China’s restive western region of Xinjiang.On India’s Eastern flank, Bangladesh is becoming a doorway for China to gain access to India’s northeast region including the Indian state of Arunchal Pradesh.Commenting on the developments in the region, Tarique Niazi stated: "More importantly, Bangladesh is believed to be causing a seismic demographic shift in anothernortheastern state, Assam, where Indian leaders claim some 20 million Bangladeshis have moved in. Indian officials fear the emergence of Assam as the secondMuslim-majority state within Indian Union, after the state of Jammu and Kashmir"( The Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 5, Issue 9, April 26, 2005).Continuing, Tarique Niazi stated: "Above all, China prizes Bangladesh for its immense natural gas reserves (60 trillion cubic feet) which rival those of Indonesia.Bangladesh’s geographic proximity with Myanmar makes these reserves accessible to China… Unlike Bangladesh, Nepal has little energy potential to tempt Beijing,but its strategic location between China and India makes it just as important. Nepal’s borders meets China’s restive western province of Tibet on the one hand, andNaxalite-dominated Indian states on the other…Almost 40% of India’s 593 districts are, to a degree, under Naxalite influence. As a result both China and India viefor Katmandu’s favour"(Ibid).

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

The Indian Ocean was relatively quiet when the 13th Amendment came into effect in Sri Lanka in 1987. Since then, the Indian Ocean has become a zone of intenseactivity. With the rise of both India and China as potential world powers, their growth depends on assured supplies of oil and natural gas. Consequently, the IndianOcean has become a locus of important international sea lines of communication.These developments have become a source of concern for India. During a Conference conducted by the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in August 19-21,2003 Indian participants had expressed that in their view China was India’s number one security concern.

In addition, India is concerned with other littoral countriessuch as Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Malaysia gaining substantial space and strategic autonomy because of the desire of external powers to forgealliances and coalitions in the region. Sri Lanka’s relations with China and now Iran are part of these evolving developments.India’s concerns are understandable considering China’s attempts to secure its energy supplies through the Indian Ocean. The Straits of Hormuz and the Straits ofMalacca are two choke points in the Indian Ocean that could disrupt the uninterrupted passage of oil to China. China is therefore building complex naval bases inGwadar in Pakistan and Sitwe in Myanmar with the intention of delivering oil overland to China through Pakistan/Afghanistan. With a view to meeting thesechallenges, India is building a naval base in Karwar in its Western coast known as Project Seabird, developing naval facilities in the East known as the Andaman andNicobar Command, and yet another port at Dawel in Myanmar. China’s involvement with the harbour at Hambantota Sri Lanka is another vital piece of this evolvingIndian Ocean landscape. Pakistan, Iran and Russia are increasingly realising the strategic relevance of the Indian Ocean.

SECURITY OF SRI LANKA

This level of activity in the Indian Ocean was not present when the 13th Amendment was introduced in 1987 devolving Power to Provincial Councils. In thebackground of developments now taking place in the Indian Ocean how prudent is it both for India and Sri Lanka to devolve powers to Provincial Councils whichwould then have opportunities to develop relationships and alliances with any of the several players now wanting a foothold in the Indian Ocean?The 13th Amendment was intended to resolve Sri Lanka’s national question.

Therefore, it was meant to address an internal issue. Devolution to provincial units in SriLanka in the environment of developments in the Indian Ocean could permit developments in India’s south flank that could be inimical to India’s as well as SriLanka’s interests; developments that both India and Sri Lanka would not be in a position to contain.

Under these circumstances, devolution has gone well beyondbeing a concept to merely address internal issues. Instead, devolution has become a concept with many external ramifications.Unlike the other provinces of Sri Lanka, devolution to the Northern and Eastern Provinces has the potential to develop unrestrained external alliances, as happenseven today with regional governments in India. The fact that these two provinces were not in a position to exercise any devolved powers thus far has contributed tothe security and stability of both India and Sri Lanka. This has enabled Sri Lanka to exercise central control without hindrance from these two provincialadministrations. However, the future under the 13th Amendment, although welcomed by India, would bring in security risks that should be carefully considered.

CONCLUSION

The restive situation in India’s North, East and West is likely to be a feature that India would have to live with for a long time to come. India’s south flank has beenrelatively safe from external influences except for minor irritations from the LTTE. With the Indian Ocean becoming the focus of interest of several ambitious nations,India has now to pay attention to its south flank. In this regard, political arrangements such as the 13th Amendment in Sri Lanka could seriously undermine India’ssecurity.

Over the last two decades the threat to India’s south flank was only through the activities of the LTTE. India was confident that this was a threat it could handle withrelative ease. With political power being devolved to the Northern and Eastern Provincial Councils, possibilities exist for alliances to develop between these provincesand global powers that have security and economic interests in the Indian Ocean. The security of both India and Sri Lanka can be assured only if powers toperipheral units are decentralised and the unit itself is small enough to assure security to both countries. Such a unit would be the District.In the context of emerging developments in the Indian Ocean, political arrangements that may have had relevance at one time need to be reconsidered in the light ofemerging realities if serious consequences are to be avoided.

With the LTTE’s confinement to the Northern Province there is also a possibility of Eelam transformingitself into a Greater Eelam involving India. Therefore, India has to give priority to its national interests over the parochial interests of coalition party politics, and revisitdevolution to provinces in Sri Lanka as a concept if it is secure its south flank.Within the context of these developments, Sri Lanka’s own interests would be best served by a strong center where Executive power is shared by all communitiesand Legislative power is exercised by the entire Parliament through Standing Legislative Committees with oversight powers over Executive action. Since a secure SriLanka is the best security guarantee for India, India has to seriously reconsider the wisdom of "welcoming" the implementation of the 13th Amendment.

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The killing fields of Muhamalai

The Island lk 010508-by Our Defence Correspondent

The killing fields of Muhamalai claimed hundreds more combatants on Wednesday, as government troops and LTTE cadres fought each other to a standstill in one ofthe biggest battles in almost a year.The Muhamalai-Nakar Kovil–Vettilaikerni areas has traditionally been a mass graveyard for both sides, and more than 5,000 on both sides have perished over thissmall piece of land, in battles starting as far back as 1991.By the end of the day, troops had gained little ground in the massive operation, which was then suspended indefinitely. Seventy-six soldiers were killed or are missing-presumed dead, according to the official government figure. The LTTE admitted losing only 16 cadres killed, but the Army claimed to have killed more than 100rebels.Both figures are likely to be incorrect, and the real number of Tigers killed can be expected to be somewhere in-between these two figures. The LTTE officiallyclaimed to have killed 100 soldiers, while pro-LTTE websites have an even higher figure of 150.One hundred and twenty soldiers sustained injuries, according to the Army’s figures, and the number Tiger cadres who were wounded is yet to be ascertained.The LTTE claimed a major victory over the armed forces. The Government in turn denied that it was a defeat and claimed to have inflicted devastating losses on theTigers.The correct story is that both sides lost huge numbers of fighters, which will have an adverse effect on the ability of both to launch fresh operations. However, theArmy is more able to take such losses than the LTTE, due to its numerical superiority.Strategically, the battle was a stalemate. Neither side gained or lost any significant ground. In the end, the forward defence lines continue to be in almost the samelocations as before, although the Army has advanced a few hundred yards in some small areas. However, since it was the Army that moved forward, the LTTE canrightly claim to have halted the offensive.The battle began shortly after midnight, when troops of the 53rd Division and 55th Division advanced in the darkness into LTTE defence lines. They met littleresistance at first, but moved slowly as they had to clear their way through obstacles such as mines and barbed wire.However, although the soldiers gained ground initially during the darkness, their progress was too slow, and once dawn broke, heavy LTTE resistance began. Bythen, troops had taken over the Tigers’ first line of defence, and were moving into the second line. But a rain of mortar and artillery fire from many concealed guns farbeyond the battlefield, caused havoc among the advancing troops. This firing was extraordinarily accurate, proving that the Tigers had prepared exact co-ordinates tofire upon their own defence lines once the Army captured them. The maelstrom of fire forced the soldiers to retreat.Unfortunately, the hasty retreat meant that some soldiers were cut off in the vanguard of the offensive, and perished. The LTTE recovered 28 bodies and handedthem over to the Army later through the International Committee of the Red Cross.The inability of Air Force jet bombers and helicopter gunships to silence the enemy artillery was a key factor in the battle. The Tigers had camouflaged the guns verycarefully, and the Air Force did not know their locations beforehand. When dawn broke, the guns started their deadly barrage, and SLAF air strikes were too few innumber to take out the many guns. By the time the air strikes became accurate enough, the Army had been forced back, and the Tigers are believed to have quicklymoved the guns back and under cover.The entire operation was in fact a miscalculation of the LTTE’s strength in the Muhamalai area. The Army had believed that the months of fighting in the Mannar-Madhu areas had weakened the Tigers to the point where they would have withdrawn cadres from the Jaffna front to reinforce the southern Wanni fronts. Certainly,the LTTE has fought tooth and nail in the Madhu area, as it will be a considerable loss of prestige to lose control of the Madhu shrine, sacred to Catholics. And theymay have withdrawn some cadres from the Jaffna front. However, the Tigers are clearly stronger in numbers than the Army believed, and also possess far more longrange weaponry – artillery and mortars – than was expected. In the small area of operations, the numerical superiority of the Army was of little effect, despite havingtwo divisions of troops advancing.In the end, it was not the number of Tiger cadres that dictated the course of the battle, but the number of artillery guns and mortars, and the level of accuracy of thefire. The Muhamalai area is a narrow spit of land with the Jaffna Lagoon on two sides, which can be easily and accurately targeted by long range fire.Meanwhile, there was better news on the Madhu front, as soldiers continued to encircle the area, battling inch by inch closer to the church. Many expected the churchcompound to be taken this week by the Army, which will be a major propaganda victory, despite the fact that the sacred statue has been removed by churchauthorities to a safer location in the nearest church.This week’s battle in Muhamalai was only the latest in a long history of battles in the area, in which casualties on both sides have been counted in the hundreds andeven thousands.The first major battle was in 1991, when the LTTE laid siege to the Elephant Pass Army Camp. It was defeated after more than a month when Lt. Gen. DenzilKobbekaduwa led a rescue mission that landed by sea. More than 1,000 Tiger cadres were killed in the battle, as were 150 soldiers.The next major battle here was in the year 2000, when the LTTE overran the Elephant Pass-Vettilaikerni Army Complex, killing more than 1,000 soldiers. The Tigersmarched to the very doorstep of Jaffna town before being halted.The Army then pushed back the Tigers to Muhamalai, and the defence lines have been in the same location since then.In August 2006, the LTTE suffered a major defeat at Muhamalai, when their attempt to advance up the A9 road was beaten back. This was a turning point in EelamWar IV, as the Tigers suffered heavy casualties that had a negative influence on their entire campaign. More than 400 Tigers were killed.However in October 2006, the Army tried to advance in the opposite direction and suffered heavy casualties, again to artillery fire. Nearly 200 soldiers were killed.Muhamalai is not in itself of any strategic value. It is simply the point where the FDLs have been stuck there for some seven years now, from before the beginning ofthe last ceasefire. If the Army succeeds in capturing the area, it will simply be pushing the Tigers back, further from Jaffna town. It will also inch closer towardsthrowing the Tigers entirely out of the entire Jaffna Peninsula.The Army’s hope has been that a breakthrough at Muhamalai would push the LTTE back a considerable distance, all the way back to Elephant Pass and beyond.This would open up another avenue for the Army to attack the Wanni, this time from the north.However, the lesson that frontal assaults will not work has clearly not yet been learned. The fact is that the tigers are prepared to fall back a little during the night, andhave prepared their artillery barrages carefully for maximum effect in daylight. Troops cannot move quickly enough through all the obstacles of mines, booby trapsand barbed wire, to reach the enemy’s rear areas and destroy the heavy guns before they begin spouting death.The Army’s resources would be better used to attack the Tigers’ heartland in the Wanni from other fronts such as Mannar, Madhu, Weli Oya, and Vavuniya. Theseare far broader fronts, where the numerical superiority of the Army is a heavy advantage to the soldiers, and the Tigers will spread themselves thinly while defendingagainst multiple assaults from many points.What this week’s battle unfortunately did was to hand the LTTE a propaganda victory at a time when it is hard-pressed after losing territory for nearly two yearsnow. During this time, the LTTE lost the entire Eastern Province, losing key battles at Mutur, Sampur, Vakarai, and Thoppigala. They have since then been on thedefensive in the Mannar and Madhu areas for many months.Yet, the Tigers did not gain anything strategic from this week’s battle either, apart from perhaps delaying the Army’s advance in the Wanni.